Abstract
The sciences make progress through inquiries that address human problems. Many of those problems are practical, although some arise from detached curiosity. I think of this progress as pragmatic (Kitcher 2017): improving problematic situations, rather than aiming towards some goal (e.g. the fundamental laws of the universe). The identification of a problem depends on value judgments: a genuine problem is one in which valuable aims are blocked. As Heather Douglas and Torsten Wilholt have argued cogently (Douglas 2009, Wilholt 2009), value judgments play roles in individual scientific decisions (and in the social practices that coordinate such decisions). Some of those judgments are, as many defenders of the value-free ideal have recognized, open to devastating objections. Scientists who publish and campaign for conclusions, on the basis of skimpy evidence, moved by a desire to advance their careers, are rightly condemned; so too are collective decisions, motivated by the wish to advance some disputed cause. Thus, there arises “the new demarcation problem” (Holman & Wilholt, 2022). What values properly play a role, in setting the research agenda, in accepting and broadcasting alleged discoveries, and in instituting and refining the social structures in which the research of a scientific community is embedded? An obvious suggestion: actions in the practice of science are subject to ethical constraints – just as other human behavior is. To judge some change in scientific practice as replacing an ethically dubious value judgment by one that is endorsed across the human population justifies that change as progressive. After all, few people have qualms about viewing the diminution of cruelty to animals as justified. Yet science can also make progress through an inquiry into values, one that exposes the rationale for an ethical stance and broadens acceptance of it. That inquiry can strengthen the justification for value judgments deployed in the sciences. Further, ethical inquiry can also amend value judgments, so that introducing progressive ethical changes into scientific practice yields another justified judgment of scientific progress. When is an ethical change progressive? Ethical changes are justified when they respond to situations justifiably counted as problematic, in ways that are justifiably viewed as solving those problems (typically partially). Justification accrues from our best efforts to follow a procedure, involving deliberation among representatives of all those affected by the problem, employing the best available information, and striving for a solution all can accept (Kitcher 2021). Well-ordered science should be seen as an ideal, not in specifying a goal, but as a diagnostic tool for identifying and addressing problematic situations. Even though it is sometimes, perhaps often, absurd to think in terms of consensus, well-ordered science can diagnose progress in ethical inquiry. That’s enough. References Holman, Bennett and Torsten Wilholt 2022 “The New Demarcation Problem”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 91, 211-220 Douglas, Heather 2009 Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press Kitcher, Philip 2017 “Social Progress”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 34 (2), 46-65 Kitcher, Philip 2021 Moral Progress, New York: Oxford University Press Wilholt, Torsten 2009 “Bias and Values in Science”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, A, 40, 90-101
