The sciences make progress through inquiries that address human problems. Many of those problems are practical, although some arise from detached curiosity. I think of this progress as pragmatic (Kitcher 2017): improving problematic situations, rather than aiming towards some goal (e.g. the fundamental laws of the universe). The identification of a problem depends on value judgments: a genuine problem is one in which valuable aims are blocked. As Heather Douglas and Torsten Wilholt have argued cogently (Douglas 2009, Wilholt 2009), value judgments play roles in individual scientific decisions (and in the social practices that coordinate such decisions). Some of those judgments are, as many defenders of the value-free ideal have recognized, open to devastating objections. Scientists who publish and campaign for conclusions, on the basis of skimpy evidence, moved by a desire to advance their careers, are rightly condemned; so too are collective decisions, motivated by the wish to advance some disputed cause. Thus, there arises “the new demarcation problem” (Holman & Wilholt, 2022). What values properly play a role, in setting the research agenda, in accepting and broadcasting alleged discoveries, and in instituting and refining the social structures in which the research of a scientific community is embedded? An obvious suggestion: actions in the practice of science are subject to ethical constraints – just as other human behavior is. To judge some change in scientific practice as replacing an ethically dubious value judgment by one that is endorsed across the human population justifies that change as progressive. After all, few people have qualms about viewing the diminution of cruelty to animals as justified. Yet science can also make progress through an inquiry into values, one that exposes the rationale for an ethical stance and broadens acceptance of it. That inquiry can strengthen the justification for value judgments deployed in the sciences. Further, ethical inquiry can also amend value judgments, so that introducing progressive ethical changes into scientific practice yields another justified judgment of scientific progress. When is an ethical change progressive? Ethical changes are justified when they respond to situations justifiably counted as problematic, in ways that are justifiably viewed as solving those problems (typically partially). Justification accrues from our best efforts to follow a procedure, involving deliberation among representatives of all those affected by the problem, employing the best available information, and striving for a solution all can accept (Kitcher 2021). Well-ordered science should be seen as an ideal, not in specifying a goal, but as a diagnostic tool for identifying and addressing problematic situations. Even though it is sometimes, perhaps often, absurd to think in terms of consensus, well-ordered science can diagnose progress in ethical inquiry. That’s enough. References Holman, Bennett and Torsten Wilholt 2022 “The New Demarcation Problem”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 91, 211-220 Douglas, Heather 2009 Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press Kitcher, Philip 2017 “Social Progress”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 34 (2), 46-65 Kitcher, Philip 2021 Moral Progress, New York: Oxford University Press Wilholt, Torsten 2009 “Bias and Values in Science”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, A, 40, 90-101

The demarcation problem has been one of the most important problems in philosophy of science for centuries. Still, the problem has never been solved. The failures, in fact, have been so numerous and so diverse and they have gone on for so long that Larry Laudan issued a death warrant for the problem decades ago. Who would have thought, then, that the demarcation problem would arise again, but with none of its old challenges?! True, the new version is more modest than the old: it seeks only to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate value influences in science, not legitimate from illegitimate science. No matter. That modesty enables successful demarcations to be more readily provided. After all, modern science right from the start was billed as a way—indeed, the way—to improve the lot of humanity and make the world a better place (elsewhere I have called this “Bacon’s promise”). Which value influences are the legitimate ones should thus be easy enough to settle: they are simply those that actually yield this happy outcome. Of course, the devil is in the details. So, consider one of the most pressing societal issues of our time, the structural racism that continues to oppress minority groups in the U.S. and elsewhere. Focus especially on Blacks/African Americans in the U.S. In this case the sad truth is that science, far from making things better as it was supposed to do, has for centuries made things worse. The illegitimate values that helped to produce this result included, of course, the racist values that shaped so much of the social and biological research that was done. And to an alarming degree this research is still being done. But these illegitimate values also included the racist values that continue to shape so much of the important research that is not being done, the research that would be helpful to Blacks if it were done. This is the agnotological part of the story, and it includes, as well, the failure to encourage and support the Black scientists and would-be scientists who would most likely do that research. But what of the legitimate values, the values that would produce the flourishing of Blacks? This was, remember, the outcome of science that was supposed to occur. Such legitimate values clearly include anti-racist—egalitarian—values. For it is these values that motivate and shape the critiques and corrections of the past and present science that is harmful to Blacks. Still, these legitimate values have to include quite a bit more than anti-racist values. For, critiques and corrections, as crucial as they are, only help to control the damage to Blacks that racist science causes. They don’t go the extra distance to produce the flourishing of Blacks. What else is needed is a question Black scientists have been exploring. I will suggest that an analogous question arises within feminist science studies although it has not been recognized. This is just one of the interesting issues that the new demarcation problem brings to light.

The general consensus amongst philosophers is that values play an integral role in scientific inquiry. This requires a reorientation towards delineating legitimate from illegitimate values in science, or the new demarcation problem. Although it has been argued that alternatives to the value-free ideal (VFI) for science should at least serve the same purposes as the ideal given that some of its aims remain desirable, redrawing the boundaries between acceptable and inappropriate values does not address how the VFI is interwoven into institutional structures that support science. Viable VFI replacements will have to work within or reconstruct these pillars in order to succeed it. At the height of the VFI's influence (immediately after WWII) the VFI relied on the linear model for science funding. Public funds invested in basic (or pure) scientific research, with oversight and distribution by scientists, financed basic research in academic institutions. The findings from research would then be taken up by scientists working in privately funded labs who could produce public goods. Under this model, scientists interested in basic science could not be held accountable for the societal impact of their work. The VFI thrived because scientists were absolved from considering the social or ethical implications of their work, which separated science from society. Scientists were simultaneously called to advise policy-makers where they were able to occupy political spaces and maintain their independence by providing advice without the responsibility of making any decisions themselves. The science advisor’s role was to protect the integrity of science, respect for scientific knowledge and the institutions that housed it, rather than to consider the public impact of the decisions. Instead politicians were seen as morally responsible and accountable for the consequences of scientifically informed decisions. At the same time, an increasingly technical society was believed to impair the public’s ability to make informed decisions. Addressing this worry became the role of science communicators who helped to develop concepts like science literacy— or a familiarity with science thought to be desirable for the overall well-being of individuals and the state. Science literacy was cultivated through the deficit model which described the public as homogeneously ignorant of science and unable to engage it directly. Science understood as something central to civic life meant creating a foundation of scientific understanding. Even if science literacy could include more than scientific facts, in practice science literacy required information about science to be neatly encapsulated, evaluated and communicated. Science educators developed the consensus view, a focus on scientific information with the most agreement, and emphasised the empirical findings of science. As values remain a contentious area in science, they are not taught under the consensus view, strengthening the VFI. In sum, the linear model, independent science advisor, science communication and science education have reinforced the VFI and challenge progress towards dismantling and establishing alternative ideals for science. For any replacement to be successful, it will have to reimagine how science interfaces with these institutions or construct new institutions to support science altogether.

Parts of the politically conservative block in the United States have a long history of “science denialism”. As a means to explore the nature of the New Demarcation Problem (Holman and Wilholt, 2022) and its relation to the original Popperian demarcation problem this paper considers an example of each. The first is the movement to undermine the status of Darwinian evolution as the scientific explanation of human origins. The second is the “sound science” movement which has sought to challenge a significant amount of the science that undergirds environmental regulation. As means of explaining what is wrong with creationism, multiple philosophers have framed the issues in terms of the Popperian Demarcation Problem (e.g., Kitcher 1983). Drawing on such work, Sven Ove Hansson (2017) has compared and categorized both creationism and conservative critiques of environmental science as pseudoscience. However, while some of the rhetorical tactics are shared, I will argue that a closer analysis of the “sound science” movement (e.g., Milloy 2016) reveals—at least on some occasions—a rejection of science that is infused with and/or dependent on a set of values that he (and fellow conservatives) do not share (e.g. in commenting on his shaping of the Trump EPA policy Milloy averred: “I do have a bias. I’m all for the coal industry, the fossil fuel industry. Wealth is what makes people happy, not pristine air” quoted in Korman 2018). Ultimately, I argue Hansson is right only in part. Both debates share a number of features (e.g., a struggle over the cultural authority of science) and are rightfully both categorized as problems of demarcation. However, the nature of the debate is importantly different. Whereas creation science can be seen as an example of wishful thinking, in some environmental cases conservatives are rejecting science that fails to be “value-apt”, a rational response to science infused with unshared values (John 2019). This distinction illustrates an important difference between the new and old demarcation problems. Whereas the Popperian Demarcation Problem concerns what makes inquiry scientific, the New Demarcation Problem turns on an account of the proper role for science to play in a liberal democracy and what science must be like to be able to fulfill that role. Hansson, S. O. (2017). Science denial as a form of pseudoscience. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 63, 39-47. Holman, B., & Wilholt, T. (2022). The new demarcation problem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 91, 211-220. John, S. (2019). Science, truth and dictatorship: Wishful thinking or wishful speaking?. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 78, 64-72. Kitcher, P. (1983). Abusing science: The case against creationism. MIT press. Kormann, C. (2018). Scott Pruitt's crusade against “secret science” could be disastrous for public health. The New Yorker, 26. Milloy, S. J. (2001). Junk science judo: Self-defense against health scares & scams. Cato Institute. Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. Routledge.