Breeds are classifications of domestic animals that share a set of conventional phenotypic traits. We claim that, despite classifying biological entities, animal breeds are social kinds. Breeds originate in a social mechanism (artificial selection) by which humans dominate the agency of certain animals about their reproductive choices. The stability of breeds is typical of social, not biological kinds: they allow for scientific predictions but, like any other social kind, once the social forces sustaining the classification vanish, so does the kind. Breeds provide a simple scale model to discuss intervention on more complex social kinds like race or gender.

Measurement of subjective animal welfare creates a special problem in validating the measurement indicators. Validation is required to ensure indicators are measuring the intended target state, and not some other object. While indicators can usually be validated through looking for correlation between target and indicator under controlled manipulations, this is not possible when the target state is not directly accessible. In this paper, I outline a four-step approach using the concept of robustness, that can help with validating indicators of subjective animal welfare.

In this paper we examine “gain of function” (GOF) research in virology, which results in a virus that is substantially more virulent or transmissible than its wild antecedent. We examine the typical animal model, the ferret, arguing that it does not easily satisfy potential desiderata for an animal model. We then discuss how these epistemic limitations bear on practical and policy questions around the risks and benefits of GOF research. We conclude with a reflection on how philosophy of science can contribute to policy discussions around the risks, benefits, and relative priority of particular life sciences research.

Natural history collections are repositories of diverse information, including collected and preserved biological specimens. These specimens are sometimes integrated into conservation decision-making, where some practitioners claim that specimens may be necessary for conservation. This is an overstatement. To correct this, I engage with the current literature on specimen collection to show that while specimens have epistemic shortcomings, they can be useful for conservation projects depending on the background or shared values of scientists and decision-makers. This modest approach acknowledges that specimens provide a unique information channel while demarcating where and when values intercede into conservation planning.