Abstract
Scientific consensus plays a crucial role in public life. In the face of increasing science denialism, scientists are under pressure to present themselves as a united front to combat misinformation and conspiracy theories. However, the drive for consensus also has negative epistemic consequences, such as masking expert disagreement and obscuring value judgments. There exists widespread agreement among philosophers that dissent plays an important epistemic role in scientific communities. Disagreements among scientists are inevitable in areas of active research and dissent is crucial in facilitating collective inquiry. How should we understand the epistemic role of dissent and determine when it is normatively appropriate? Does scientific consensus have any intrinsic epistemic value? What consensus-generating methods are apt and in which circumstances? The aim of this symposium is to present new research on the social epistemology of consensus and dissent. The papers collected in this symposium address the question of how to balance the epistemic advantages and disadvantages of consensus and dissensus. Through a variety of different case studies, ranging from pandemic policy to medical imaging and climate science, the papers offer different perspectives on how scientists can better communicate disagreement when interfacing with policy makers and the public.
