Bad News for Inference to the Best Explanation but Good News for the Epistemology of Science.

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Submission Summary
I argue that thinking with good reason that a hypothesis $H$ is the best available explanation for some phenomenon does not entail that we are justified in believing $H$. Thus, inference to the best explanation does not in general give us justified belief. My argument is distinct from the so-called `bad lot' argument, revolving instead around the claim that the amount of evidence required for justifying belief in a hypothesis is typically greater than the amount of evidence required for making plausible that the hypotheses is the best of all available explanations.
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University of Chicago

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