Against “Possibilist” Interpretations of Climate Models

This submission has open access
Submission Summary
Climate scientists frequently employ heavily idealized models. How should these models be interpreted? Some philosophers have promoted a possibilist interpretation, where climate models stand in for possible scenarios that could occur, but don't provide information about how probable those scenarios are. The present paper argues that possibilism is undermotivated, incompatible with successful practices in the science, and liable to present a less accurate than probabilistic alternatives. There are good arguments to be had about how to interpret climate models but our starting point should be that the models provide evidence relevant to the evaluation of hypotheses concerning the actual world.
Submission ID :
PSA2022316
Submission Type

Associated Sessions

Presenter
,
Leibniz Universität Hannover

Similar Abstracts by Type

Submission ID
Submission Title
Submission Topic
Submission Type
Primary Author
PSA2022514
Philosophy of Biology - ecology
Contributed Papers
Dr. Katie Morrow
PSA2022405
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Contributed Papers
Vincenzo Crupi
PSA2022481
Confirmation and Evidence
Contributed Papers
Dr. Matthew Joss
PSA2022440
Confirmation and Evidence
Contributed Papers
Mr. Adrià Segarra
PSA2022410
Explanation
Contributed Papers
Ms. Haomiao Yu
PSA2022504
Formal Epistemology
Contributed Papers
Dr. Veronica Vieland
PSA2022450
Decision Theory
Contributed Papers
Ms. Xin Hui Yong
PSA2022402
Formal Epistemology
Contributed Papers
Peter Lewis
96 visits