Abstract
Philosophers agree that the value-free ideal is neither an accurate nor desirable model for science. Science typically requires non-epistemic value judgments. Debates remain as to what kind of non-epistemic values can legitimately influence science, and in what ways. One proposal is that “when scientists must appeal to nonepistemic values in the course of their work, they should appeal to democratic values—roughly, the values held by the public or its representatives” (Schroeder 2021, 2. See also Intemann 2015). In this paper, I argue that this view fails to solve the problems it aims to solve while raising other serious issues. The paper relies on two case studies: the controversy over wolf population management in the Yellowstone area and the long-lasting dispute over management of the National Bison Range on the Flathead Reservation. The democratic-endorsement view is supposed to solve two problems: 1. Legitimacy. Scientific research influences lay people’s daily lives, either through policy or direct, pervasive impact. Such influence qualifies as non-epistemic authority over the people. Legitimate authority in liberal democratic society is grounded in democratic endorsement. Hence, non-epistemic value influence in science is legitimate only if it appeals to democratically endorsed values. 2. Public Trust. The fall of the value-free ideal has eroded public trust. If non-epistemic value judgments influence science, then the people will and ought to trust science only if such values are representatives of their own values. Democratic endorsement is thus the best ground for warranted public trust in science. The democratic-endorsement view most likely fails to solve the problems above. It relies on the assumption that our society can find some overlapping consensus regarding non-epistemic values, which can then ground scientific consensus and public trust. Unfortunately, such consensus is likely lacking, especially in ecology and conservation biology. The controversy over Yellowstone wolf population management is a case in point (Smith et al. 2016). Value conflict and polarization undermine democratic consensus and the democratic endorsement view. The view also raises some serious issues, most prominently the issue of marginalization. Democratic consensus most likely ignores the needs and wants of historically marginalized communities. A study of the controversy over the management of the National Bison Range on the Flathead Reservation shows that democratically endorsed values may build upon a history of wrongful prejudice (Upton 2014). The democratic-endorsement view also faces the issue of non-neutral expertise. It is often impossible (and misguided) to be both informed and neutral. Expertise informs non-epistemic value judgments. The public is often in no position to make properly informed value judgments. An alternative to the democratic-endorsement view, one that respects both the public’s interest, including minorities’, and expertise is called for. Schroeder, S. Andrew. 2021. Democratic values: a better foundation for public trust in science. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(2), 545-562. Intemann, Kristen. 2015. Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 5, 217–232. Upton, Brian. 2014. Returning to tribal self-governance partnership at the National Bison Range Complex: Historical, legal, and global perspectives., 35, 51-146. Smith, Douglas.W., White, P.J., Stahler, Daniel.R., Wydeven, Adrian. and Hallac, David.E., 2016. Managing wolves in the Yellowstone area: Balancing goals across jurisdictional boundaries. Wildlife Society Bulletin, 40(3), 436-445.
