Abstract
Over the past twenty years, philosophers of science have given sustained examination to the role that values play in science, identifying positive roles for both cognitive and noncognitive values. These include value judgments made during research, such as the conceptualization of phenomena, data selection and analysis of results, as well as in applications of scientific knowledge for policy. Consequently, many philosophers have concluded that although there is a risk that dogmatically held values may bias scientific research, there is also a legitimate role for values in scientific judgment. The distinction between the two is whether scientists are transparent about their value assumptions and methodological choices and whether the social and ethical values at play are widely shared and have been subjected to deliberation (Elliott 2017, 14-15). Conservation science overtly rests on normative postulates, and its journals have long made space for normative debates about the fit between conservation practices and the normative goal of preserving biological diversity (Soulé 1985). In this paper I identify a gap between, on the one hand, philosophers’ endorsement of transparent deliberation about values and, on the other hand, the practical methods, shared norms, and concrete guidance required to move from discussing values in a theoretical way to incorporating them into practice. Although conservation scientists discuss values openly, norms have not developed for systematic moral deliberation and, after deliberation, action. I argue that, while it is necessary, at times, to talk about scientific research and values separately (in philosophical terms, to distinguish facts and values), it is also essential, following discussion, to systematically incorporate values into conservation research. I investigate two specific techniques for incorporating values into science with regard to debates in conservation science about managed relocation. First, I identify how knowledge gaps block conservation practice. Knowledge gaps are created and maintained by a bias in favor of theory over practice and a conservative bias toward existing frameworks for conservation practice rather than innovation. Because theoretical research carries more prestige than applied research, the majority of new research in conservation science describes species and ecological relationships—states, causes, and mechanisms—rather than designing, implementing, and evaluating conservation interventions (Williams, Balmford & Wilcove 2020). The consequent lack of practical knowledge entrenches value-based arguments against novel interventions on the grounds that their consequences are unknown. A second technique to encourage discussions of values involves reforming risk assessment frameworks. Typically, risks posed by interventions are measured against the status quo or a past benchmark rather than being compared to likely future states given rates of biodiversity loss and ecological degradation. By ignoring the urgency of conservation needs, this practice systematically biases risk assessment frameworks toward inaction. In sum, I use examples from managed relocation to demonstrate how an ethos of restraint follows from uncertainty about how to integrate values into conservation research. In contrast, an ethos of responsible action follows from a more thoroughgoing analysis of the role values can play in action-oriented conservation research.
