Birmingham
Nov 11, 2022 03:45 PM - 05:45 PM(America/New_York)
20221111T1545 20221111T1745 America/New_York Philosophy of Cognitive Science Birmingham PSA 2022 office@philsci.org
Representational EnactivismView Abstract
Contributed Papers 04:15 PM - 04:45 PM (America/New_York) 2022/11/11 21:15:00 UTC - 2022/11/11 21:45:00 UTC
In the literature on enactive approaches to cognition, representationalism is often seen as a rival theory. In this paper, I argue that enactivism can be fruitfully combined with representationalism by adopting Frances Egan’s content pragmatism. This representational enactivism avoids some of the problems faced by anti-representational versions of enactivism. Most significantly, representational enactivism accommodates empirical evidence that neural systems manipulate representations. In addition, representational enactivism provides a valuable insight into how to identify representational content, especially in brainless organisms: we can identify representational content by investigating autopoietic processes.
Presenters
ZZ
Zhexi Zhang
Graduate Student, University Of California, Davis
A critique of pure Bayesian cognitive scienceView Abstract
Contributed Papers 04:45 PM - 05:15 PM (America/New_York) 2022/11/11 21:45:00 UTC - 2022/11/11 22:15:00 UTC
Bayesian approaches to human cognition have been extensively advocated in the last decades, but sharp objections have been raised too. We outline a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with prevalent strands of Bayesian cognitive science (pure Bayesian cognitive science), relying on selected illustrations from the psychology of reasoning and tools from the philosophy of science. Bayesians’ reliance on so-called method of rational analysis is a key point of our discussion. We tentatively conclude on a constructive note, though: an appropriately modified variant of Bayesian cognitive science can still be coherently pursued.
Presenters
VC
Vincenzo Crupi
University Of Turin
Co-authors
FC
Fabrizio Calzavarini
University Of Turin
Do Bayesian Models of Cognition Show That We Are (Epistemically) Rational?View Abstract
Contributed Papers 05:15 PM - 05:45 PM (America/New_York) 2022/11/11 22:15:00 UTC - 2022/11/11 22:45:00 UTC
“According to [Bayesian] models” says a recent textbook in cognitive neuroscience, “the human mind behaves like a capable data scientist”. Do they? That is to say, do such models show we are rational? I argue that Bayesian models of cognition, perhaps surprisingly, do not and indeed cannot, show that we are Bayesian-rational. The key reason is that they appeal to approximations, a fact that carries significant implications. After outlining the argument, I critique two responses, seen in recent cognitive neuroscience. One says that the mind can be seen as approximately Bayes-rational, while the other reconceives norms of rationality.
Presenters
AL
Arnon Levy
The Hebrew University Of Jerusalem
University of Wollongong
Graduate student
,
University of California, Davis
University of Turin
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Mr. Tim Elmo Feiten
University of Cincinnati
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