Abstract
My re-conception of realism is based on new pragmatist notions of knowledge, truth and reality, which are elaborated in the forthcoming book Realism for Realistic People. These notions are designed for better understanding and facilitation of scientific and quotidian practices. I focus on “active knowledge,” which consists in knowing how to do things. Active knowledge both enables and utilizes propositional knowledge. The quality of active knowledge consists in the “operational coherence” of epistemic activities. Operational coherence is about designing our activities so that they make sense as plans for achieving our aims, and it is a notion deeply connected with the interpretive dimensions of Chirimuuta’s haptic realism. I re-conceive the very notions of reality and truth in terms of operational coherence, thereby rendering them as concepts operative in actual practices: roughly speaking, true propositions facilitate operationally coherent activities, which deal in real entities. Empirical truth is not a matter of correspondence to an inaccessible sort of mind-independent reality; the correspondence achieved in real practices is among accessible realities that are “mind-framed” yet not “mind-controlled.” My main interest in reconceiving realism is to turn it into an operational doctrine that we can actually put into practice, and in keeping with the best scientific practices. I take realism in and about science as “activist realism”: a commitment to do whatever we can in order to improve knowledge. And I take this in a realistic spirit, focusing on the search for what we can actually do in a process of continual learning. There are some implications of activist realism that would be contrary to the instincts of standard scientific realists, and I will highlight three of them in this presentation. (1) Following the imperative of progress inherent in activist realism naturally results in a plurality of systems of practice, each with its real entities and its true propositions. The link with Massimi’s perspectivism is evident, including the notion of natural kinds that she develops in this symposium. (2) Activist realism eliminates the unproductive opposition between realism and empiricism. The kind of naturalism advanced by Massimi also connects naturally with both realism (in my sense) and empiricism (in the usual sense). (3) The activist stance allows us to condemn those who work against empirical learning, while not claiming for ourselves supernatural access to “external reality.” The drive toward continual empirical learning may place activist realism into an interesting tension with Vickers’ preference for “future-proof” facts: should realists be eager to engage in new learning that may overturn the most secure-seeming facts of today?
