Abstract
Although measurement is widespread across the human sciences, the reliability of measurement in these disciplines is often contested. Philosophers of science have developed conceptual models for how measurement practice progresses in the natural sciences, highlighting in particular the virtuous co-development of theoretical understanding and measurement procedures. The extent to which these accounts of measurement are applicable outside the natural sciences, however, remains unclear. Measurement in the human sciences faces a number of specific challenges, which are related to the peculiarities of the phenomena under study. For instance, since nomological networks do not abound in the human sciences, measurement has less theoretical resources to draw from. Moreover, human scientists and philosophers of science debate about the very measurability of the complex and multidimensional properties of interest in these disciplines. Finally, many of the properties measured in the human sciences are value-laden and context-dependent and this raises questions about the possibility of having standardized measurements, which are valid across different contexts and distinct ethical grounds. In an attempt to enrich the philosophical accounts of measurement practice in the human sciences, this symposium addresses these challenges and evaluates scientists’ strategies to deal with them. This symposium’s participants include both early-career, mid-career, and more senior scholars, and major contributors to the philosophy of measurement.
